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This is the second part of a two-part analysis of the PCIJ’s Advisory Opinion
concerning the Interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The first part reviewed
the opinion’s background and the drafting history of article 3 of the 1923 Treaty
of Lausanne which the Advisory Opinion focussed on. Article 3 concerned the
delimitation of the boundary between Turkey and Iraq following the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire. The key point of contention was whether that boundary could be
drawn by the Council of the League of Nations without the consent of the States
affected by the decision: Turkey and the United Kingdom. While the United Kingdom
maintained that consent was irrelevant, Turkey maintained the opposite. In the
first blog post, it was argued that the drafting history of article 3 favoured Turkey’s
position. Below it will become apparent that the PCIJ nonetheless followed the
arguments advanced by the UK, finding that the boundary could be drawn without
Turkey’s consent.
 The Advisory Opinion of the PCIJ
Apparently disregarding the lengthy discussions concerning the importance of a
consensual solution to a border dispute amongst the Parties to the 1923 Treaty
of Lausanne, and questioning the significance Lord Curzon’s original proposal of
23 January 1923 (“no decision can be arrived at without [Turkey’s] consent”), the
PCIJ held that the absence of any reference to the “question of the consent of the
Parties to the solution to be recommended by the Council” following Lord Curzon’s
proposal, means that the Parties’ did not attach particular importance to the question
of consent (Adv. Op., [23]).
But this turns the burden of proof on its head. In light of Lord Curzon’s clear
assurance that no decision would be reached without Turkey’s consent and the
Parties’ repeated reference to Lord Curzon’s “original proposal”, it is the PCIJ’s
counter-factual understanding that would need to be proven by establishing that
the “original proposal” was abandoned. Indeed, given the importance of that
question, one would expect nothing less than an explicit acknowledgment of such
abandonment and yet the record is completely silent on this matter.
Finally, the PCIJ moved beyond article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty and considered
whether the League could give effect to the Parties’ alleged intention by departing
from its fundamental unanimity principle. Observing prudently that “[o]nly if the
decisions of the Council have the support of the unanimous consent of the Powers…
will they possess” (Adv. Op., [29]) the required degree of authority, the PCIJ then
determined that the principle of unanimity can sometime be departed from. In
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support of this contention the PCIJ referred inter alia to articles 44 (concerning the
protection of minorities) and 107 (concerning cross-border “travellers or goods”)
of the Lausanne Treaty (Adv. Op., [30]). However, neither article is similar in
content or importance to the case at hand. The PCIJ also relied on article 15,
LONC, which deals with disputes and does indeed consider the implications of
recommendations adopted irrespective of the consent of the interested parties (Adv.
Op., [31]). However, article 15, LONC, concerns non-binding recommendations
rather than binding decisions with the most serious of consequences. Against that
background, it is simply wrong to state that “the circumstances contemplated” by
article 15, LONC, meet “the requirements of a case such as that now before the
Council” (Adv. Op., [32]). Even Lauterpacht, who praised the PCIJ’s approach,
admitted that the PCIJ’s construction in this regard departs from the “explicit…letter
of the Convention” (Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by
the International Court (Cambridge University Press 1982) 160). As such the PCIJ’s
interpretation of both the Lausanne Treaty and the LONC is more than questionable.
The PCIJ’s reference to the “well-known rule that no one can be judge in his own
suit” (Adv. Op., [32]) in support of the PCIJ’s overall conclusion represents this
decision’s ultimate absurdity. This is especially so given that of the 10 PCIJ judges
hearing the case, four were nationals of countries who had fought with or assisted
Turkey’s enemies only a few years earlier while the remaining judges were nationals
of neutral countries. Certainly, the principle is of significant importance, but it is a
principle designed to safeguard the impartiality of judges in judicial proceedings.
However, as the PCIJ had itself observed, the members of the Council are political
representatives facing a political dispute (Adv. Op., [26-27]). Hence, the principle is
entirely inapplicable to the resolution of a political dispute. Indeed, if this principle
was to be applied to the political realm, then the votes of political stakeholders
affected by a particular measure could never be counted. Surely, this would be
nonsensical especially in light of the PCIJ’s observation that “it is hardly conceivable
that resolutions on questions affecting the peace of the world could be adopted
against the will of those…Members…who, although in a minority, would…bear the
larger share of the consequences….” (Adv. Op., [29]).
Conclusion
Lauterpacht shared the present author’s view that the PCIJ’s decision in the Advisory
Opinion on the Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne represents a “bold piece of
judicial legislation” (Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by
the International Court (Cambridge University Press 1982) 160). Yet, Lauterpacht
hailed the PCIJ’s “determined effort to see the purpose of the [League’s] Covenant”
fulfilled (Lauterpacht, 161). It is questionable whether the PCIJ’s interpretation was
the only way to realise the purpose of the Covenant and whether a consensual fixing
of the frontier under the auspices of the League was a truly inconceivable option.
This is especially so considering that the PCIJ’s incautious demeanour caused
Turkey to withdraw entirely from participating further in the resolution of the dispute,
that Turkey postponed its initial efforts to join the League by almost 10 years and
that even the Council itself chose not to apply the PCIJ’s reasoning regarding the
non-consensual settlement of disputes on subsequent occasions (eg in relation
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to Japan’s invasion of China in 1931). But the most troubling aspect of the PCIJ’s
decision lies in the fact that the PCIJ sanctioned and bestowed with a sense of
legality a non-consensual process of fixing boundaries in the Middle East whose
evident inadequacy continuous to plague the region until the present day. That is not
to say that a consensual agreement between Turkey and the UK would necessarily
have guaranteed more stability in the region – especially, because all other local
stakeholders (most importantly the Kurds) were still excluded from the process. But
it does mean that at a critical moment the newly established PCIJ put the integrity
of international law and the respect for its own judgments on the line by interpreting
a treaty provision seemingly in accordance with the PCIJ’s own and not the Parties’
wishes.
One might argue this goes too far and that the PCIJ’s arguments are not entirely
incredible and that especially the Parties’ subsequent conduct does lend some
support to the PCIJ’s conclusions. But even if that is to some extent correct, the
PCIJ could have avoided any suspicion of partiality by complying at least with its
own principle to choose from different admissible interpretations that interpretation
“which involves the minimum of obligations…if the wording of a treaty provision is
not clear” (Adv. Op., [27]). And if there is one thing which is clear by the PCIJ’s own
admission (Adv. Op., [20]), then it is that article 3 is simply not clear. Against this
background, it would have been better if the PCIJ had resisted the temptation of
succumbing to the time’s imperialist spirit by limiting itself to what the PCIJ does
best – interpreting and applying the law – instead of venturing consciously into the
dangerous territory of policy making.
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